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Abstract 
Dopamine is thought to play a crucial role in value-based decision making. However, the specific 
contributions of different dopamine receptor subtypes to the computation of subjective value 
remain unknown. Here we demonstrate how the balance between D1 and D2 dopamine receptor 
subtypes shapes subjective value computation during risky decision-making. We administered 
the D2 receptor antagonist amisulpride or placebo before participants made choices between 
risky options. Compared to placebo, D2 receptor blockade resulted in more frequent choice of 
higher risk and higher expected value options. Using a novel model fitting procedure, we 
concurrently estimated the three parameters that define individual risk attitude according to an 
influential theoretical account of risky decision making. This analysis revealed that the observed 
reduction in risk aversion under amisulpride was driven by increased sensitivity to reward 
magnitude and decreased distortion of outcome probability, resulting in more linear value 
coding. Our data suggest that different components that govern individual risk attitude are under 
dopaminergic control, such that D2 receptor blockade facilitates risk taking and expected value 
processing. 
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 Introduction  
Risk is common in our lives and affects many everyday decisions (for example, whether to 
gamble in the casino, which insurance policy to purchase, or which school to enroll in). When 
making decisions between risky options, people need to balance the magnitudes of potential 
gains and losses with the probabilities that they will occur. One possibility is to multiply the 
magnitudes of risky outcomes by their respective probabilities to calculate each choice option’s 
expected value and choose the option with higher expected value irrespective of risk (Pascal, 
1948). However, behavioral evidence indicates that people have individually different risk 
attitudes, and therefore value risky options differently. This often results in options with lower 
expected value being chosen if the alternative option has higher risk (Christopoulos et al  2009), 
a phenomenon known as risk aversion.  
A highly influential psychological model to describe this behavior, prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979), postulates that risk-sensitive economic choice can be described by non-linear 
conversion of objective outcome magnitudes and probabilities into subjective value, or utility. 
Specifically, prospect theory postulates that preferences over risky options can be explained by 3 
parameters that define a person’s utility function. Firstly, the curvature of the utility function, σ, 
captures whether an individual is risk averse (concave utility function) or risk seeking (convex 
utility function). A second parameter, α, governs how much probabilities are distorted, with 
smaller probabilities typically being overweighted and larger probabilities underweighted. 
Thirdly, a parameter (λ) that controls how much steeper the utility function is for losses than for 
gains captures the degree of loss aversion. Together, these parameters describe utility functions 
that model subjective risk attitudes by governing how individuals respond to the magnitudes and 
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probabilities of outcomes encountered in risky options. Prospect theory was introduced because 
it can explain behaviors that more traditional models such as expected utility theory (Bernoulli, 
1954, von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007) cannot explain. According to expected utility, risk 
preferences are driven by the curvature of the utility function, without probability distortion or 
loss aversion. 
The neural basis for value encoding under risk has been widely investigated, with the 
dopaminergic system emerging as a neural substrate for processing economic value. Dopamine 
neurons encode reward magnitude (Schultz, 1998), combine reward magnitude with probability 
(Tobler et al 2005) into prospect theory- or expected utility-like value signal of gains in both 
risky and safe options (Stauffer et al 2014). In addition, people suffering from disease- or drug-
induced modifications to the dopaminergic system demonstrate differences in risky decision 
making (Rogers et al 1999; Bornovalova et al 2005; Leland & Paulus, 2005). Rodent studies 
have shown that reward value (Howe et al 2013) and the subjective value of risk (Sugam et al 
2012) is expressed in dopamine release, that risky decision making can be modulated by 
stimulating the inputs to dopamine neurons (Stopper and Floresco, 2014), dopamine neurons 
themselves (Stopper et al 2014), or striatal D2-receptor neurons (Zalocusky et al 2016) and that 
receptor-specific dopaminergic drugs can bias preferences for risky versus safe outcomes 
(Stopper et al 2013).  However, the question of precisely how the dopaminergic system 
processes the components of subjective risk attitude and how the different parameters governing 
it are mediated by different dopamine receptor subtypes remains unanswered.   
One recent model has proposed that risk attitude is governed by the balance of D1- and D2- 
receptor mediated activity in the dopaminergic system (Clark & Dagher, 2014; Mikhael & 
Bogacz, 2016). The model is compatible with animal literature (Kravitz et al 2012; Lee et al 
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2016; Surmeier et al 2014; Tai et al 2012) but remained largely untested. Specifically, it 
proposes that the subjective sensitivity to potential rewards in risky options (i.e., utility 
curvature) is D1-mediated, and the subjective sensitivity to potential punishments (i.e. loss 
aversion) is D2-mediated. Without pharmacological intervention, this sensitivity is typically 
reduced for larger rewards, reflected in concave utility functions from which risk aversion partly 
arises. By extension, a reduction in D2 mediated (inhibitory) activity  should enhance sensitivity 
to large monetary rewards in risky options, resulting in more linear (or possibly convex) utility 
functions and reduced risk aversion.  
To test this idea, we pharmacologically blocked D2-receptors while participants made choices 
between risky options. We hypothesized that D2 antagonism would decrease risk aversion by 
increasing the sensitivity to larger reward magnitudes and thereby reducing the concavity of the 
utility function (Fig. 1A). In addition, risk aversion could also be modulated through a reduction 
in probability distortion, allowing people to more accurately compute the probabilities associated 
with risky outcomes, or through a decrease in loss aversion (Fig. 1B), making people less 
sensitive to potential negative outcomes from risky options. Any of these effects would predict 
that an expected utility model would fit the data better than a prospect theory model under D2 
antagonism. To test these different possibilities, we conducted a randomized double-blind, 
placebo-controlled pharmacological intervention in two groups of healthy participants while they 
performed a dynamic risky decision making task (Fig. 1C) designed to elicit their underlying risk 
preferences.    
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Methods & Materials 
Participants 
Using a randomized double-blind placebo-controlled between-subjects design, we recruited 93 
participants from the student population at the University of Zurich and randomly assigned them 
to one of two groups. Both groups were matched in terms of baseline measures that may 
influence drug effects on the dopaminergic system, including age, sex, BMI, working memory 
capacity (digit span task), and mood, alertness and calmness, which were measured using the 
multidimensional mood state (MDMQ) questionnaire (Steyer et al 1997). One group received 
placebo (n=48) while the other received a 400mg dose of amisulpride (n=45). The results 
reported here form part of a larger study. In addition to the risky decision task, participants 
performed temporal and effort discounting tasks, a prosocial decision making task (Soutschek et 
al in press), a reversal learning task, and a stop-signal-reaction time task. 
Pharmacological Manipulation 
Amisulpride is a dopamine antagonist that selectively blocks neurotransmission at dopamine 
D2/D3 receptors (Rosenzweig et al 2002). At low doses (50-300mg), amisulpride primarily 
prevents dopamine action at presynaptic D2/D3 autoreceptors (Racagni et al 2004), thus 
effectively stimulating dopaminergic neurotransmission. At higher doses (≥400mg), amisulpride 
preferentially antagonizes post-synaptic D2/D3 receptors (Schoemaker et al 1997). The used 
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dose of 400 mg is thus at the lower end of postsynaptically active high doses (Müller et al 2002; 
Rosenzweig et al 2002) and occupies about 70% of D2 receptors (Meisenzahl et al 2008). To 
limit extrapyramidal side effects, we refrained from using higher doses. Two plasma 
concentration peaks are typically observed during the absorption period, with the first, lower 
peak occurring approximately 1-2 hours after ingestion (Le Bricon et al 1996).  
Task 
After receiving placebo or amisulpride, participants waited for 1.5 hours in the controlled 
laboratory environment. Participants then performed a risky decision making task (Fig. 1C), 
which consisted of 20 trials where they made choices between two risky options presented at the 
same time on the screen. The task was programmed using the Cogent toolbox (v1.32) and 
MATLAB (R2016b). All decisions were between 2 compound lotteries of the form p chance of 
magnitude x, 1-p chance of magnitude y. Lotteries were constructed on a trial-by-trial basis by 
combining different levels of  𝑥,𝑝,𝑦 , where 𝑝 ∈  0.1, 0.3, 0.5,0.7,0.9 , 
𝑥 ∈  1, 30, 40, 100, 1000  and 𝑦 ∈  −20,−15,−10,−5, 5, 10, 30 , with 𝑥 and 𝑦 denominated 
in Swiss francs (CHF). On every trial, one lottery was presented on the left side of the screen and 
one on the right side, with the magnitudes and their associated probabilities on the same 
horizontal plane. For example, Fig. 1C illustrates a choice between a lottery on the left side that 
results in a gain of 100 Swiss francs with 50% chance or a loss of -15 Swiss francs with 50% 
chance and a lottery on the right side that results in a gain of 40 Swiss francs with 90% chance or 
10 Swiss francs with 10% chance. To ensure incentive compatibility, one trial was randomly 
selected at the end of the experiment and the lottery chosen by the participant in that trial was 
realized. The outcome was added to or subtracted from the fee participants received for taking 
part (120 Swiss francs) in the pharmacological experiment. Specifically, participants were 
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instructed to treat every decision as if it were the one being selected at the end and therefore 
make their choices according to their true preferences. Average payout was 22.3 Swiss francs; 28 
participants incurred losses. 
Dynamic Task Design 
After each choice, the task adaptively presented a new pair of lotteries to the participant that 
optimized the sequence of possible trials to recover the participant’s true risk preferences. In 
such a way, each new lottery pair maximizes the amount of information about the participant’s 
risk attitude, given their decisions on preceding trials. We implemented the adaptive Bayesian 
method described by Toubia and colleagues (Toubia et al 2013), where the posterior distribution 
over prospect theory parameters is updated after each choice and the task selects a new pair of 
lotteries that maximizes the amount of information over the parameters to home in on the 
participant’s true risk attitude (Supplementary Material - Dynamic Task Design). This Bayesian 
approach to adaptive elicitation of risk attitude differs from the typical bisection approaches used 
in psychophysics (Cornsweet, 1962) and allows accurate elicitation of risk preferences within 20 
trials (Supplementary Fig. S1) by adapting both the probabilities and magnitudes for both options 
on every trial (as opposed to keeping one option fixed as in more traditional staircase/bisection 
approaches).  
Simulations 
Simulations confirmed that the method could recover true parameter values within 20 trials 
(Supplementary Fig. S1) and was robust to different priors (Supplementary Fig. S2). Simulations 
were also conducted to assess the unique impact of each parameter on choices (Supplementary 
Fig. S3). Full details of these simulations can be found in the supplementary material. 
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Data analysis 
Choice frequency data and response times were analyzed using the statistics toolbox of 
MATLAB in a series of t-tests and ANOVAs. The specific behavioral measures used in our 
model-free analysis were the proportions with which (i) the higher variance or (ii) the higher 
expected value lottery was chosen. Mixed-effects multiple and logistic regressions were carried 
out in R. For the expected value sensitivity analysis (Fig. 2D), we computed the expected values 
of both options for each trial, binning these values around 10, 20, 50, 70, 100, 500 and 1000CHF 
and created dummy variables to encode the presence of each expected value in the high risk (+1) 
or low risk (-1) options on each trial, and regressed participants’ choices for the high risk option 
against these dummy variables using a mixed effects logistic regression that included both fixed 
and random effects for each participant. Regression parameters for each dummy variable (i.e. the 
influence of each expected value on risky choices) were normalized between 0 and 1, directly 
compared using ANOVA and plotted in Fig. 2D. 
Choice Models & Fitting 
Prospect theory model fitting (Figs. 2 & 3) was applied in MATLAB according to the 
hierarchical Bayesian framework described in detail in Toubia and colleagues (2013) using the 
standard cumulative prospect theory model used in the literature (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) 
with standard probability weighting (Prelec, 1998) to the placebo and amisulpride groups 
separately. Our use of group-wise hierarchical Bayes was motivated by two factors: 1) The 
relatively large number of participants in each group and 2) relatively small number of trials per 
participant. Options are defined by  𝑥,𝑝;𝑦  with outcome x occurring with probability p and 
outcome y occurring with probability 1- p. Formally, the value of an option to a participant is 
given by: 
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𝑈 𝑥,𝑝,𝑦,𝛼,𝜎, 𝜆 =  
𝑣 𝑦,𝜎 + 𝜋 𝑝,𝛼  𝑣 𝑥,𝜎 − 𝑣 𝑦,𝜎  𝑖𝑓 𝑥 > 𝑦 > 0 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 𝑦 < 0
𝜋 𝑝,𝛼 𝑣 𝑥,𝜎 + 𝜋 1 − 𝑝,𝛼 𝑣 𝑦,𝜎 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0 < 𝑦
  
where 𝑣 𝑥,𝜎 =  
𝑥𝜎 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 > 0
−𝜆(−𝑥𝜎 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 0
  
and 𝜋 𝑝,𝛼 = exp −(−ln 𝑝)𝛼  
In the hierarchical Bayesian framework, a uniform prior distribution of the model parameters is 
specified and a posterior distribution is calculated by obtaining the prior with the choice data 
from the participants. The hierarchical Bayesian approach also allows more accurate group 
estimates by simultaneously leveraging individual and group level estimates (utility curvature, ; 
probability distortion, ; and loss aversion, ), such that individual estimates deemed to be 
unlikely, i.e. outliers given the group distribution, receive less weight than more reliable 
measures. The uniform prior ensures that the mode of the posterior distribution (maximum a 
posteriori) is equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimate (Toubia et al 2013; p.620).   
We assessed the fit of each model for each participant based on the softmax choice rule 
(supplementary methods). Expected utility and expected value models were fitted using 
maximum likelihood estimation. Formally, the expected utility of an option is given by: 
𝑈 𝑥,𝑝,𝑦,𝜎 = 𝜋 𝑝 𝑣 𝑥,𝜎 + 𝜋 1 − 𝑝 𝑣(𝑦,𝜎) 
where 𝑣 𝑥,𝜎 = 𝑥𝜎  
and the expected value of an option is given by: 
𝑈 𝑥,𝑝,𝑦 = 𝜋 𝑝  𝑥 + 𝜋 1 − 𝑝 (𝑦). 
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Results 
In line with the observation that humans typically are risk averse (e.g., Christopoulos et al 2009), 
analysis of the choice data revealed that the placebo group was risk averse, with the proportion 
(45.2%) of choices of the riskier option being significantly smaller than 50% (one-sample t-test, 
t47=-2.78, p=0.008), even though the expected value of the safer options was smaller than that of 
the riskier options. Importantly, compared to the placebo group, participants under dopamine 
D2/D3 receptor blockade were significantly less risk averse, showing more choices of the higher 
risk option (mixed effects logistic regression with risky choice as dependent variable, treatment 
as primary independent variable and participant as a random independent variable, chi 
square=5.14, p=0.023; Fig. 1D). This effect also arose when we entered working memory 
capacity (a proxy for baseline dopamine synthesis capacity) as a regressor of no interest into the 
model (chi square=5.01, p=0.025). Please note that amisulpride did not cause participants to 
become risk seeking, as the proportion (50.2%) of high variance choices in the treatment group 
was not significantly different from 50% (one-sample, one-tailed t-test, t44=0.49, p=0.62), 
suggesting that under amisulpride participants were risk-neutral.  
Participants under amisulpride were also more likely to choose the higher expected value option 
than participants under placebo (mixed effects logistic regression, chi square=6.89, p=0.008; 
with working memory capacity as a regressor of no interest: chi square=6.46 and p=0.011; Fig. 
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1E). Although risk and expected value are necessarily correlated in our task (to avoid decisions 
where one option strictly dominates the other), we ran a multiple mixed effects logistic 
regression to assess if amisulpride affected high expected value choices and higher risk choices 
to different degrees. There was no significant difference in the regression weights between 
expected value and risk (one-sample t-test, t147=-1.11; p=0.85), suggesting that reduced risk 
aversion under amisulpride arose from similar effects on expected value and risk processing. 
To determine if reduced risk aversion in the amisulpride group could be explained by increased 
choice randomness under amisulpride, we ran a test assessing the number of consecutive choices 
above or below the mean of the choice vector (implemented using Matlab’s ‘runstest’ function). 
This showed that the choice profile in both the amisulpride and placebo groups was not random 
(Z=-1.09; p=0.28). Additionally, participants under amisulpride were less random in their choice 
of the higher expected value option than participants under placebo (Fig. 1E). Moreover, model-
based analyses showed that if anything, amisulpride was associated with less variation in 
behavior, both in probability distortion and loss aversion (see below). Finally, response times did 
not differ between the amisulpride and placebo groups (two-sample t-test, t91=-0.44; p=0.66), 
providing no evidence that the amisulpride group made choices less carefully than the placebo 
group. 
A decrease in risky choices under amisulpride could arise from increased linearity in the 
curvature of the utility function, a reduction in loss aversion, changes in the probability 
weighting function, or a combination. To investigate these possible channels of amisulpride 
action, we recovered the σ, λ, and α parameter values for each participant by fitting a prospect 
theory model to the choice data using hierarchical Bayes. Using the average parameter values 
from the fitting, we plotted the recovered utility function across arbitrary amounts. Visual 
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inspection of this average utility function (Fig. 2A) showed a more linear function (and 
decreased probability distortion; see below and Fig. 3) for the amisulpride group. This 
impression was confirmed by directly comparing the best fitting parameters, with the 
amisulpride group showing significantly less curvature (i.e. the σ parameter was closer to 1) than 
the placebo group (amisulpride=0.741; placebo=0.548; t91=-3.82 p=0.0001; two-sample t-test; 
p=0.0003 when controlling for working memory; p=0.0002 when controlling for weight; Fig. 
2B). Thus, participants under amisulpride exhibited significantly decreased concavity in their 
utility functions.  
To further illustrate these findings, we next used the individual utility curvature parameters to 
transform objective outcome magnitudes into subjective values. Using the best fitting utility 
curvature parameter (σ) for each participant, we inferred the subjective value of objective reward 
magnitudes with the power utility function specified according to prospect theory (i.e., objective 
monetary magnitude in Swiss francs raised to the power of σ for each participant). A two-way 
ANOVA with objective monetary magnitude (CHF 5, 10, 30, 40 & 100) and treatment 
(amisulpride/placebo) as factors revealed a significant interaction effect of treatment and 
monetary magnitude (F4,92=4.07, p=0.003), with participants under amisulpride showing 
increased sensitivity to outcome magnitudes as these magnitudes increased (Fig. 2C). Thus, 
behavioral choices under amisulpride were in agreement with the notion that participants 
assessed gain and loss magnitudes in the risky options in a more linear and objective fashion.  
Next, we assessed whether the more linear value function under amisulpride (Fig. 2C) translated 
into increased sensitivity to expected value. To test this possibility, we calculated the expected 
values (probability x magnitude) of all options presented to each participant. Then we performed 
a mixed effects logistic regression to assess the influence of expected value on the probability of 
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participants selecting the higher expected value option. If amisulpride increased expected value 
sensitivity, one would expect to see significantly larger regression weights for high expected 
values in the amisulpride group. Indeed, a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction 
effect of high (larger than median rank of 100 Swiss francs) versus low (smaller than median) 
expected values with placebo versus amisulpride treatment (F2,10=4.99; p=0.046), indicating 
higher expected values had a significantly different impact on choices for the two groups (Fig. 
2D). Fisher r-to-z transformation confirmed that the increasing value sensitivity was significantly 
more tightly correlated to increasing expected value in the amisulpride group compared to the 
placebo group (Z=2.1, p=0.02). These data suggest that the value processing system under 
amisulpride indeed becomes more sensitive to increases in expected value. 
Because expected value incorporates both magnitude and probability information, one possibility 
is that amisulpride affects not only value curvature but also probability distortion. Indeed, visual 
inspection of the probability weighting function for the two groups suggests that amisulpride 
reduced probability distortion (Fig. 3A). To test this possibility quantitatively, we directly 
compared the probability distortion parameters for the two groups. Compared to placebo, 
probability distortion was significantly lower under amisulpride (amisulpride=1.059; 
placebo=0.804; t91=-4.63 p=0.0001 two-sample t-test; p=0.0001 controlling for working memory 
capacity; p=0.0001 controlling for weight), resulting in a more linear mapping of objective 
probabilities and less heterogeneity in probability distortions (Fig. 3B & E). Specifically, in the 
amisulpride group α values ranged from 0.56 to 1.52, whereas in the placebo group they ranged 
from 0.26 to 1.56 (Fig. 3D). A Bartlett’s test for the equality of variances in the revealed 
functions showed a significantly smaller spread in probability distortion in the amisulpride group 
(Bartlett’s test statistic=7.79; p=0.005). This more linear mapping of objective probabilities 
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under D2/D3 receptor blockade could result in less risk aversion for lotteries with typically large 
probabilities that were underweighted by the placebo group.  
To determine whether reduced utility curvature or probability distortion was the primary driver 
of reduced risk aversion under amisulpride, we regressed participants’ choice frequency of high 
risk and high expected value options against treatment*parameter interactions simultaneously 
(multiple linear regression). For high risk choices, both utility curvature (=0.15; p=0.0001) and 
probability distortion (=0.06; p=0.02) parameters impacted choice, but compared to probability 
distortion (R
2
=0.19), utility curvature explained significantly more variance (R
2
=0.28) in the 
frequency of riskier choices (linear hypothesis test on coefficients, F=21.58; p=0.0001). A 
similar pattern arose for high expected value choices (utility curvature =0.22; p=0.0001; 
probability distortion =0.08; p=0.02), with utility curvature explaining significantly more 
variance (R
2
=0.42 compared to R
2
=0.25; linear hypothesis test on coefficients, F=17.49 
p=0.0001). Thus, amisulpride effects on both parameters significantly impacted choices in our 
data, but within the range of decisions used in our task, the effect on the utility curvature 
parameter appeared to have a significantly higher impact on driving decreased risk aversion.     
The two groups did not differ significantly in the recovered loss aversion parameters 
(amisulpride=1.412; placebo=1.409; t91=-0.35, p=0.73; two-sample t-test; Fig. 3C).  A two-way 
ANOVA with parameter values (α, σ, and λ), and group treatment as factors confirmed that there 
was no significant effect of the drug on participants’ loss aversion parameters (p=0.99) in our 
task, suggesting that dopamine may be more strongly involved in coding the subjective 
processing of probability and gain magnitude rather than loss aversion. It may be worth noting 
that also this analysis showed significantly less variance in the parameter estimates for the 
amisulpride group than the placebo group (Bartlett’s test statistic=17.62, p=0.001; Fig. 3C), 
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again indicating that amisulpride did not simply increase randomness in choice behavior. 
Overall, utility curvature and probability distortion were significantly correlated (R
2
=0.27; 
p<0.001). There was no significant correlation between utility curvature and loss aversion 
(R
2
=0.03; p=0.09) or probability distortion and loss aversion (R
2
=0.03; p=0.11). For the 
amisulpride group, there was no correlation in parameter values and behavioral measures with 
weight (all p-values >0.1). 
Finally, we computed both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) for each model fit, penalizing more complex models by correcting for the 
number of free parameters. We then used Bayesian model comparison to determine which model 
(prospect theory, expected utility or expected value) best explained the observed choices in both 
groups. Focusing on AIC in the placebo group, prospect theory fitted the observed choices 
significantly better than expected utility and expected value models (Fig. 4A; exceedance 
probability=1.0; p=0.001; 38/48 participants classified as prospect theory types). In striking 
contrast, in the amisulpride group, expected utility theory fitted behavior significantly better than 
prospect theory (Fig. 4B; exceedance probability=1.0; p=0.03; 28/45 participants classified as 
expected utility types). Comparison of BIC also confirmed this result (Supplementary Fig. S4). 
Thus, the expected utility model best explained choice behavior when D2-receptor action was 
blocked. 
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Discussion 
Our results indicate a key role for the dopaminergic system in the processing of subjective values 
during risky decision making. Specifically, D2/D3 receptor antagonism reduced risk aversion. 
Computational modeling revealed that this effect arose from two channels: an increase in the 
linearity of the utility curvature, reflected in higher sensitivity for larger reward magnitudes, and 
a decrease in probability distortion. By extension, the expected utility model explained choice 
behavior best under amisulpride whereas prospect theory had the highest explanatory power 
under placebo. 
By concurrently and systematically estimating all three parameters governing risky decision 
making according to prospect theory we assessed the effects of D2/D3 receptor blockade on each 
parameter separately, which provides a clear advance to the literature (St Onge & Floresco, 
2009; Kandasamy et al 2014; Sokol-Hessner et al 2015). The linearized utility curvature and 
probability distortion functions under amisulpride are exactly what would be expected if 
dopaminergic projections and dopaminoceptive neurons of the nigrostriatal or mesolimbic 
systems are involved in coding the subjective value of risky choice options. Indeed, the two 
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parameters co-determine subjective value and affect choice, both in humans (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and other animals, such as non-human primates (Stauffer et al 2015). 
Previous studies have clearly demonstrated that dopaminergic manipulation has an effect on risk 
taking. For example, L-DOPA (which, after conversion to dopamine, stimulates both D1 and D2 
receptors concurrently) has been shown to increase choices for riskier gambles involving small-
stake gains (but not those involving small-stake losses) and increase baseline gambling 
propensity (Rutledge et al  2015; Rigoli et al 2016) in a value independent fashion. In line with 
these findings, our data show that dopamine is important for risk taking and that it is less 
involved for loss than for gain processing during risky choices. In addition, the present findings 
reveal that receptor-specific dopamine manipulations can affect risky choice and that the effects 
arise through effects on utility and probability distortion. Moreover, our data show that the effect 
of amisulpride depends on value and is particularly pronounced at high expected values. This 
finding is in line with a multiplicative rather than an additive effect of the drug on value 
processing (Zhang et al 2009) and suggests that it may be important to use a large range of 
possible outcomes. The finding that dopamine D2/D3 receptor blockade also reduces discounting 
of larger later rewards (Weber et al 2016) suggests that the mechanism of increased sensitivity to 
larger gain magnitudes generalizes to other forms of value-based decision making. 
A major target for dopamine neurons is the striatum and other parts of the basal ganglia that 
regulate the selection versus inhibition of actions through a direct pathway onto internal globus 
pallidus and substantia nigra pars reticulata versus an indirect pathway on these structures via the 
external globus pallidus. The direct, D1-mediated (go) pathway facilitates the learning of actions 
to approach rewards, whereas the indirect D2-mediated (no-go) pathway inhibits behavioral 
responses and facilitates learning from subjectively less valued outcomes (Cox et al 2015; 
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Kravitz et al 2012). Dopamine has opposing actions in the two pathways. At D2-neurons, 
dopamine facilitates inhibition of the indirect pathway by impeding up-state transitions, 
diminishing up-state spiking and promoting long-term depression at excitatory glutamatergic 
synapses (Surmeier et al 2014). Accordingly, postsynaptic D2 antagonism should boost the 
indirect pathway, resulting in increased competition between the direct and the indirect pathway 
and possibly other regions of the brain (Lee et al 2016). In this regard, it is worth noting that 
dopamine actions on D4 receptors in the cingulate cortex (Cocker et al 2016) and D2 receptors in 
the insular cortex (Ishii et al 2015) affect risk taking. As the indirect pathway is thought to be 
associated with no-go responses, one speculative notion may be that D2 antagonism renders 
actions and alternatives that would normally not be chosen more viable and subjectively 
valuable. This notion is consistent with our finding that under amisulpride more risk-neutral 
choices were facilitated by both high magnitude and high probability choices, resulting in the 
selection of actions which would not normally be chosen. The notion is also consistent with our 
previous findings of amisulpride reducing reward impulsivity (Weber et al 2016) and of 
amisulpride enhancing vs. reducing generosity in men vs. women (Soutschek et al in press).  
More specifically, blocking D2-neurons may prevent the value-reducing action of D2-neuron 
stimulation by dopamine, providing a mechanistic explanation why people became more risk 
seeking in our study. This interpretation concurs with the finding that stimulating D2-neurons in 
the nucleus accumbens during the decision phase decreases risky choice of risk seeking rats in 
the stimulated trial (Zalocusky et al 2016). Thus, D2-neuron stimulation by dopamine may 
reduce the value of risky choice options and our data suggest that this effect could be prevented 
by amisulpride. Related effects have also been demonstrated in learning situations, with the D2 
antagonists such as haloperidol facilitating learning from rewards and D2 agonists such as 
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cabergoline reducing the ability to learn from rewards (Frank et al 2004; Frank et al 2007). 
However, to fully test the possibility that D2 blockade is specifically involved in utility curvature 
and probability distortion and exclude a less specific effect of reduced dopamine action, it would 
be necessary to perform a similar experiment with D1-receptor specific compounds.   
Our results also lend weight to the role of D1 and D2 receptors in the regulation of value 
encoding proposed by a recent model of uncertain reward learning in the basal ganglia that 
postulates reward magnitudes are encoded in the difference between the synaptic weights of D1- 
and D2-neurons whereas reward uncertainty is coded in the sum (Mikhael & Bogacz, 2016). 
Blocking the D2-mediated dopaminergic pathway could increase the difference between D1 and 
D2 synaptic weights, causing a concomitant increase in magnitude sensitivity as shown in our 
data. The sum of synaptic activity should also decrease, thus decreasing uncertainty coding and 
causing a decrease in risk aversion relative to the placebo group, offering an alternative potential 
mechanism for the reduction of risk aversion reported here.   
While amisulpride reduced risk aversion, it did not cause participants to become risk seeking, 
evidenced by the increased linearity of the utility and probability weighting functions. It remains 
unclear if higher doses of D2 antagonists would cause the shape of the utility function to become 
convex (and thus induce risk seeking by further increasing sensitivity to increasing monetary 
magnitudes). The literature on medication-induced pathological gambling in Parkinson’ disease 
(Molina et al 2000; Driver-Dunckley et al 2003) may suggest that this possibility is worthy of 
further investigation.  
Amisulpride not only increased sensitivity to reward magnitude but also reduced probability 
distortion. This effect is in line with the expected utility model of risky decision making 
(Bernoulli, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007) and was reflected in the increased fit of 
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this model compared to prospect theory under amisulpride. By contrast, under placebo, prospect 
theory provided a better model fit than expected utility. Together, these findings suggest that 
deviations from expected utility-like decision making are driven by D2 actions. 
In contrast to the effects on magnitudes and probabilities, our data showed that loss aversion 
remained unaffected by an acute dose of amisulpride. This finding is compatible with the notion 
that dopamine preferentially processes the value of rewards rather than punishments (Fiorillo, 
2013). However, it has been shown that tonic stimulation of D2/D3 receptors can change the 
subjective value of losses (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al 2011) and reduce negative reward 
prediction error encoding (van Eimeren et al 2009; but see Pessiglione et al 2006). It is 
conceivable that using higher doses of amisulpride would have affected loss aversion in our task. 
However, it is worth keeping in mind that the subjective definition of a loss is highly dependent 
on the reference point which may vary across experimental designs and participants (Walasek & 
Stewart, 2015). 
Amisulpride is relatively selective for D2/D3 receptors but acts also on serotonergic 5-HT7-
receptors (Abbas et al 2009). While it has been related to memory formation and sleep (Gasbarri 
& Pompili, 2014), the role of the 5-HT-7 receptor for value-based decisions is largely unknown. 
However, given that serotonin (5-HT) has been associated with punishment processing and 
response inhibition (Cools et al 2008) and with counteracting dopamine (Daw et al 2002), it 
seems unlikely that the present effects are due to 5-HT7 actions of amisulpride. Another 
limitation to the interpretation of our results is that the effects of dopaminergic drugs on 
cognitive functions are sensitive to baseline dopamine synthesis capacity, which we measured 
only indirectly in the current study through digit span (Cools et al 2009). The fact that all our 
effects were robust to inclusion of digit span data raises the question whether baseline synthesis 
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capacity plays less of a role for risky decision making than for more cognitive tasks. Although 
our groups were matched for BMI, another potential limitation is that we did not adjust mg/kg 
dosage per participant in the amisulpride group or take blood plasma readings to assess drug 
uptake at the time of the task. Our previous research showed little relation between blood plasma 
levels of amisulpride and value-based behavior (Weber et al 2016). Moreover, we did not find 
strong correlations between weight and behavioral effects. However, to fully assess the 
consequences of D2 antagonism on value processing it would be necessary to investigate dose 
response curves in future studies. Finally, the temporal specificity of D2 antagonism is difficult 
to judge using our study design, and the question whether amisulpride affects decisions at the 
time point of valuation or choice remains to be determined.  
In conclusion, this research sheds light on the specific role of dopaminergic activity in encoding 
subjective reward magnitude and probabilities during risky choice. Blockade of D2/D3 receptors 
straightened both value and probability weighting functions, resulting in more risk neutrality. 
Moreover, our findings specify the mechanisms that may underlie behavioral side-effects of 
dopaminergic medicines (either antagonistic or agonistic) used in the treatment of psychiatric 
and neurological disorders and demonstrate the differential roles of the D1- and D2-mediated 
pathways in the processing of value in risky decision making.  
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Potential effects of amisulpride on utility function, illustration of example trial and 
observed effects of amisulpride on choice behavior. A, B. Prospect theory proposes an 
asymmetrical, nonlinear and concave mapping of subjective value on increasing monetary gains 
and losses that results in different risk attitudes of individuals. A, potential effect of D2/D3-
blockade on reducing the curvature of the value function (red dashed line; prospect theory utility 
curvature parameter σ=0.7) compared with placebo (blue; σ=0.5). B, potential effect of D2/D3-
blockade on reducing loss aversion (red dashed line; prospect theory loss aversion parameter 
λ=1.5) compared with placebo (blue line; λ=2). Note that solely manipulating the loss aversion 
parameter does not affect value sensitivity in the gain domain. C. Example trial. After a fixed 
intertrial interval of 2 seconds, participants made a self-paced choice (20 in total) between risky 
options that varied in gain and loss magnitudes and probabilities and which were presented on 
the left and right sides of the screen. D. Participants in the amisulpride group chose the riskier 
(higher variance) option significantly more often than participants in the placebo group, 
indicating decreased risk aversion. E. Amisulpride resulted in more frequent choices of the high 
expected value option, consistent with increased value sensitivity.   
 
Figure 2. Observed effects of amisulpride on subjective value function from prospect theory. A. 
Fitting a prospect theory model to participants’ choices revealed a significantly more linear value 
function for the amisulpride (red) relative to the placebo group (blue). B. These findings were 
supported by utility curvature (σ) parameters being significantly closer to 1, i.e. linearity (gray 
dashed line) in the amisulpride group. Boxplots show the mean (+), and median (-), which 
coincided; boxes represent 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles and whiskers the 9
th
 and the 91
st
 percentile. 
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C. Recovered value functions for different reward magnitudes revealed a steeper and more linear 
function for the amisulpride group (red), indicating lower risk aversion when compared to the 
placebo group (blue) D. Since both utility curvature and probability weighting (Fig. 3) functions 
were more linear under amisulpride, sensitivity to increases in the expected value of the option 
should also be increased. This was confirmed by a logistic regression of choices of the higher 
expected value option against the expected value of the option, which allowed us to estimate 
regression weights as a proxy for the expected value sensitivity in the two groups. Participants 
rarely encountered extremely high option magnitudes as they were associated with high risk. 
Accordingly, we could not plot an error bar for the amisulpride group at CHF 1000. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.   
 
Figure 3. Effects of amisulpride on probability distortion and loss aversion. A. Average 
probability weighting functions were less distorted in the amisulpride group (red) than in the 
placebo group (blue). B. Accordingly, probability distortion (α) parameters were significantly 
closer to 1 for the amisulpride compared to the placebo group. C. Groups did not differ 
significantly in mean loss aversion (λ) parameters. In B and C, boxplots show the mean (+) and 
median (-); boxes represent 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles and whiskers the 9
th
 and the 91st percentile, 
with the gray dashed line representing 1 (i.e. linearity). D. To better visualize individual 
probability weighting functions we randomly selected 15 participants in the placebo group 
(whole group shown in inset). Similar to the full group, probability distortions were more 
pronounced and varied more widely in these participants. E. In contrast, the amisulpride group 
showed more homogeneous and reduced probability distortions, both in randomly selected 15 
participants and in the full group (inset). 
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 Figure 4. Estimated model frequencies from Bayesian model comparison. A. For the placebo 
group, prospect theory (PT) best explained choices in 38/48 participants, and was the best fitting 
model overall (highest exceedance probability) in comparison to expected utility (EU) or 
expected value (EV) models. B. In contrast, the expected utility model best explained choices in 
the amisulpride group, with 28/45 participants being classified as EU-types. Dashed lines in both 
panels denote the probability that all models perform equally well at best fitting participants. 
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